Strengthening public safety nets by Morduch, Jonathan & Sharma, Manohar
 
Discussion Paper 122 
Strengthening Public Safety Nets: Can the Informal 
Sector Show the Way? 
Jonathan Morduch and Manohar Sharma 
 
ecreasing household vulnerability to income reduc-
tion poses a set of challenges for public policy, the 
most immediate of which is to determine the 
appropriate role for public action. A starting point is under-
standing how communities and families cope with diffi-
culties in the absence of government interventions. Coping 
mechanisms range from the informal exchange of transfers 
and loans within families and communities to using more 
structured institutions. Access to savings and credit provide 
other buffers, while publicly-owned insurance companies 
often provide additional means to reduce vulnerability. 
Looking ahead, some private insurance companies and 
microfinance institutions are starting pilot programs to test 
possibilities for providing life, health, and property-related 
insurance to low-income clients. 
  This web of private and nonformal mechanisms prompts a 
series of questions: Will building public safety nets merely 
displace existing mechanisms? Would it be just as effective 
to strengthen existing mechanisms rather than create new 
institutions? Can the private sector and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) play larger roles? Can we systemat-
ically predict when informal insurance and the private sector 
will be most problematic and most effective? This paper 
provides some speculative answers and aims to systematize 
the main trade-offs that arise when evaluating policy options. 
 
Costs of Inadequate Insurance Strategies. Without adequate 
insurance coverage, households tend to opt for activities that 
yield less and are less risky, thus potentially reinforcing 
poverty. Moreover, negative income shocks will have to be 
absorbed through reduced household expenditures. Reduc-
tions might include pulling children out of school, reducing 
investment in businesses, and reducing consumption of nutri-
tious foods. While current consumption 
may be temporarily maintained, such 
actions seriously, and sometimes irrevers-
ibly, compromise future livelihood.  
 
Informal Insurance. In general, informal 
arrangements made to cope with income 
variability respond to considerations of how to contain 
potential distress. Some households respond by engaging in 
safer but relatively less profitable earning activities. Others, 
when the nature of income variability can be anticipated with 
a high degree of certainty, plan for crises. Finally, house-
holds may share risks, at a given point of time (e.g., receiv-
ing a transfer from a household that has not shared the same 
fate), or pool them across time (e.g., borrowing money dur-
ing “bad” times and repaying it during “good” times). 
Interhousehold Transfers.  The distribution of transfers is 
very unevenly distributed across poor households. Even in 
the same country there may be large regional differences. 
The evidence points to several tendencies: 
 
•  Despite intergenerational transfers, elderly populations 
tend to be much more vulnerable than younger popula-
tions; 
•   Large, catastrophic losses are more difficult to handle 
through private means; 
•   Idiosyncratic events that tend to affect individuals one at a 
time are easier to address through nonformal insurance, 
compared with events that affect entire communities or 
broad regions; 
•   Socially excluded groups among the poor fare worst under 
systems of nonformal insurance, while households with 
extensive community networks may cope with moderate 
idiosyncratic shocks quite well. 
 
  Nonformal insurance systems do not work well for many 
of the same reasons that private schemes fail: it is often 
difficult to enforce “contracts,” participants may not take 
adequate precautions against risks, and schemes tend to 
become increasingly less appealing to richer households as 
they begin to be perceived as redistributive. 
 
Self-Insurance: Diversifying Asset Portfolios and Re-
allocating Labor. Households lacking the means to maintain 
consumption during downturns often turn to income-earning 
activities that have smaller income variability. Two factors 
bear on such decisions. First, poor households are risk averse 
and are willing to forgo a certain amount of earnings to 
protect consumption. 
Second, risk avoidance 
will be a more serious 
concern for those lack-
ing  ex post coping 
mechanisms. A certain 
degree of poverty en-
trapment may therefore 
result when poor and risk-averse households shun new or 
profitable activities in order to contain income risks. 
 
Indigenous Insurance Mechanisms and Community In-
stitutions.  There are various schemes whereby communi- 
ties create funds to provide for emergencies such as a death 
or to pay the debts of a person who dies. While many are 
sustainable, the costs to participants can be expensive or the 
funds may be  unable to sufficiently  diversify their risk. This 
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has prompted NGOs and microfinance organizations to move 
toward cheaper, community-based products with greater 
scope for risk diversification. 
 
Household Savings. In the absence of savings accounts and 
good possibilities for buying and selling assets, rotating 
saving and credit associations (ROSCAs) can play a key role. 
In a typical scheme, members contribute funds at regular 
intervals. With each round of contributions to the common 
pot, one member of the group is given the whole amount, 
which is used to buy goods that are too costly to purchase 
with the typical cash flow of households. The advantages 
of ROSCAs are that they are simple, funds circulate at all 
times, and accounting requirements are minimal. However, 
ROSCAs are inflexible and tie up money that could be 
needed to address a temporary crisis. In Bangladesh, a varia-
tion of the ROSCA, SafeSave, helps clients build up savings 
by having staff visit them daily to collect contributions. Over 
time, clients build up a “usefully large” sum. Clients may 
also borrow against savings. 
 
Microfinance and Microinsurance. Microfinance programs 
are set up to make small loans to households lacking access 
to formal credit. The loans are earmarked for the expansion 
or development of small businesses. The programs help 
households increase their incomes and savings, and often 
help provide extra cash to help households cope with con-
sumption shocks. Such loans can also help households start 
new businesses that diversify income. 
On the other hand, by tying households to payment 
schedules, microfinance can add to vulnerability. In the face 
of a crisis, paying off debt is harder, so the credit-orientation 
of the programs may often make households less secure. 
Recognizing this, many microfinance programs are now 
turning to the possibility of providing “microinsurance” to 
their clients. 
Informal institutions such as those facilitating interhouse-
hold transfers thrive on informal, but well understood, princi-
ples of conduct and contract enforcement, and the success of 
many microfinance institutions has hinged on this fact. But 
as microfinance institutions consider more complex insur-
ance contracts, proportionately more complex systems of 
regulation and supervision will be required. 
 
New Directions: Insuring Against Weather Shocks.  State 
insurance companies have often tried to provide crop insur-
ance to poor farmers, but few have succeeded. One approach 
suggests weather insurance, i.e., insuring the source of losses 
rather than the losses themselves. A farmer who buys rainfall 
insurance, for example, pays a premium and gets a payout 
when measured rainfall is low—independent of the actual 
harvest. Thus, the value of the insurance depends on how 
highly correlated a farmer’s income is with measured rain-
fall. However, from the insurer’s perspective, there is a large 
risk. Thus, an active reinsurance market will be an important 
determinant of whether weather insurance can be viable. 
 
Will Public Action Just Crowd Out Private Activity? As 
with all safety-net policies, the costs of public action must be 
weighed against expected benefits—and the net benefits may 
be limited if it crowds out private efforts. The uneven access 
to informal insurance mechanisms makes consideration of 
crowding out difficult. Providing public safety nets may lead 
to the substantial displacement of private transfers for those 
who receive private transfers, so that their net benefits are 
less than the full size of the public transfer. But, even in the 
same region, many households receive few private transfers– 
and thus their net benefits could be large. Policymakers 
must, therefore, consider the following:  
 
•   What are the costs associated with the private efforts?  
•   Who gains from the crowding out?  
•   How is the incidence of crowding out distributed? 
•   Are public efforts more efficient than private efforts?  
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